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Abstract We introduce a model for examining the factors that lead
to the adoption of new encryption technologies. Building on the work
of Brock and Durlauf, the model describes how agents make choices,
in the presence of social interaction, between competing technologies
given their relative cost, functionality, and usability. We apply the model
to examples about the adoption of encryption in communication (email
and messaging) and storage technologies (self-encrypting drives) and also
consider our model’s predictions for the evolution of technology adoption
over time.
1 Introduction
In recent years, especially in the light of Edward Snowden’s revelations, aware-
ness of the need for enhanced privacy and confidentiality for both communi-
cations and devices has increased. In response to this, many new technologies,
including various forms of encryption, have been introduced. However, the adop-
tion of these new technologies is not guaranteed: their use depends on a number
of factors, including how effective they are, how much they cost, how easy they
are to use, and the social and policy contexts within which they are introduced.
The use of encryption for electronic communications and data storage is ac-
celerating and people are increasingly shifting to new technologies for interper-
sonal communications. Such behavioural changes are indicative of the existence
of agents revising their choices between technological alternatives to achieve their
communications goals. The aim of the paper is to provide a theoretical frame-
work which can capture such changes in the choice of technologies in the presence
of external impulses emanating from either policy or other external events.
We introduce a model, based on work by Brock and Durlauf [3], that incorpo-
rates these factors into a utility-theoretic framework that describes how agents
make choices between competing technologies. We use this model to analyse the
adoption of encryption in a range of communication and storage technologies.
We consider three examples: first, email, where we look at the use of PGP/GPG
encryption; second, messaging applications, where we examine the adoption of
WhatsApp compared to traditional SMS messaging; and, finally, the adoption
of self-encrypting drives over standard, non-encrypted drives.
The Brock and Durlauf model captures social interactions between non-
cooperative decision-making agents. This reflects the reality of decisions about
the use of encryption: agents—either individuals or organizations—make deci-
sions independently and without coordination and yet their decisions can have
an effect on the utility of other agents. For example, the utility of encrypted
communications technology to a user changes with the number of other users; it
is low if there is nobody to communicate with, and higher if it can be used to
communicate with a larger number of others.
Besides the social interactions, the Brock and Durlauf model uses the rel-
ative profitability of technologies as the main factor that determines adoption.
This single factor would not give great insight into the adoption of encryption
technologies. To this end, we introduce some modifications to the model that
allow us to examine the influence on utility—and hence, adoption—of different
technology attributes: functionality, monetary cost, and usability. These are suf-
ficient to demonstrate the model; other attributes may also be of interest for
different applications. These are multiple attributes in the sense of [6].
Other work has also looked at the adoption of security technologies. Rosasco
and Larochelle [16] look at the adoption of SSH over telnet, and considers the cost
and functionality of the technologies. Ozment and Schechter [15] use a model,
which includes a social component, to suggest strategies to promote the adoption
of DNSSEC.
In conclusion, our model is a tool for thinking about the different factors that
determine adoption, such as attributes of the technologies themselves, techno-
logical innovation, or policy. Understanding how these factors affect adoption is
important for decision-makers—those designing a technology, deciding whether
to adopt it, or seeking to promote or inhibit adoption through policy.
2 Technology Adoption Model
We start with the discrete choice model of Brock and Durlauf [3], which, in this
context, describes a system where M technologies are competing in a market
for adoption by N agents. The model assigns a share of the market to each
technology, based on its profitability. This profitability also includes a social
component: a technology can be more profitable if more agents are using it. There
can also be additional factors, such as taxes, policy, or technological innovation,
but we start with the simple model and introduce the other factors below, before
continuing with our extensions to apply the model to encryption technology.
The utility an agent receives from technology c in time period t is
uc,t = λc + ρcxc,t, (1)
where the profitability of technology c is given by λc and the number of agents
choosing c at time t is xc,t. The value ρc (where ρc > 0) defines the intensity
of the social component, the term ρcxc,t. The greater the value of ρc, the more
agents’ utilities and subsequently choices are influenced by the choices of others.
Each agent i experiences a random utility u˜i,t = ui,t + i,t, where the noise, i,t,
is independently identically distributed across agents, and known to the agent
at decision time. As the number of agents tends to infinity and when the noise
has a double exponential distribution, the probability of adoption of technology
c converges to
xc,t =
eβuc,t−1∑M
j=1 e
βuj,t−1
(2)
Here, the parameter β is the intensity of choice, and is inversely related to the
variance of the noise i,t. When β →∞, there is no noise and all agents choose
their optimal technology. When β → 0, agents pick technologies randomly, and
the share of each technology tends towards 1/M . Essentially, with higher values
of β, the equilibria points in the model become more extreme; that is, they tend
towards ‘corner solutions’ with only one surviving technology.
In this model, agents know only the social term ρcxc,t in Equation 1, which
represents the decisions of other agents and benefits associated with them.
Agents are making a choice between tech options with different profitability
to themselves, using knowledge about market penetration in the last period.
Now let’s consider a model with two competing technologies, c, a new tech-
nology, and d, an existing technology. Because there are just two, we need only
one variable, x, which is the share of agents using technology c, to keep track of
the state: xc = x and xd = 1− x. For simplicity, we also assume that the tech-
nologies experience equal increasing return on adoption; that is, ρc = ρd = ρ.
From Equation 2, the probability of adoption (and market share) of technology
c in time t is then
xt =
eβ(λc+ρxt−1)
eβ(λc+ρxt−1) + eβ(λd+ρ(1−xt−1))
=
1
1 + eβ(λ+ρ(1−2xt−1)
= f(xt−1) (3)
The model is driven by the difference of utilities between the two technologies,
ud,t − uc,t = λ + ρ(1 − 2xt), where λ = λd − λc. If the difference is positive,
agents will prefer technology d; if it is negative, they will prefer technology c.
More pronounced differences will result in ever-increasing shares for the preferred
technology.
Policy We can extend the above model with an additional component that
represents a policy about the choice between the two technologies. The policy is
imposed by some external source, and takes the form of a penalty or incentive
on one of the technologies.
As an example, assume that technology d is currently more profitable (and
hence more popular) than technology c. A policy-maker, such as a government
or industry-regulator, wishes to encourage the adoption of c and may introduce
a tax on d or impose some regulatory restriction on its use. We represent this
by adding a factor, τ , to the model: ud,t − uc,t = λ0 + ρ(1− 2xt)− τ(1− x).
As the adoption of c grows, although the taxation decreases (and vice versa)
the social reinforcement from the increased adoption will still lead to an increased
market share for c.
Technological Progress In the previous sections, the values λc and λd have
been static, meaning that the cost difference between the two technologies re-
mains constant over time. We can model a change in this difference over time
by considering how past investment in each of the technologies affects its cur-
rent profitability. We consider the impact of the cumulative investment on each
technology and postulate that such impact follows the time-dependent learning
curve stated as follows:
λc,t = λc0 + ψc
 t∑
j=1
xj
ζc and λd,t = λd0 + ψd
 t∑
j=1
(1− xj)
ζd (4)
Here, ψd and ψc are values that determine how effective investment is in making
technological progress, and ζd and ζc ∈ [0, 1] determine the shapes of the learning
curves for each of the technologies.
Now the difference in profitability depends on time,
λt = λd,t − λc,t = λ0 + ψd
 t∑
j=1
(1− xj)
ζd − ψc
 t∑
j=1
xj
ζc , (5)
as does the difference in utility, ud,t − uc,t = λt + ρ(1 − 2xt), and the share of
technology c, xt =
1
1+eβ[λt−1+ρ(1−2xt−1)]
= ft−1(xt−1).
As an example, in the first, simple model without policy or technological
progress, a new technology that starts with little market share is unlikely ever
to gain very much. However, if we model the technological change, and the new
technology has higher values of ψ and ζ than the existing technology, it can
eventually become more profitable over time, acquiring increasing market share
as a progressively increasing number of agents adopt it because of increases in
their personal profitability.
Switching Costs In the models so far, every agent makes a decision about
which technology to use in every time period. In reality, this is not the case
because there are costs associated with switching. We can model this by assuming
that a proportion, α, of agents do not switch technologies in each time period:
fτ,α(x) = αx+ (1− α) 1
1 + eβ[λ0+ρ(1−2x)−τ(1−x)]
.
The Cryptographic Utility Function Improvement in utility in the basic
model is based on a single value, λ, which is the difference in profitabilities
between the two technologies. This value, along with social externalities, policy,
and technological progress then determines the adoption of the technologies.
We introduce to the model a richer concept of utility so as to be able to
express the differences between encryption technologies in greater detail. In-
stead of a single attribute determining the utility—its profitability, in the basic
model—we use a set of different attributes, A (see [5] for this multi-attribute
utility-theoretic [6] set-up in the context of security). Thus, λ becomes the dif-
ference between the values, va, of the attributes, a ∈ A, for the two technologies
c and d: λ =
∑
a∈A(va,d − va,c).
We also wish to be able to express policies about each of the different at-
tributes, so we change τ to be a function which describes the policy for each
attribute. The difference in utilities is then given by ud,t − uc,t = λ0 + ρ(1 −
2xt) +
∑
a∈A τa(x).
Finally, we describe the development of each attribute individually as invest-
ment could affect each of the attributes in different ways. The updated model
allowing for technological progress is
λt = λd,t − λc,t = λ0 +
∑
a∈A
ψa,d
 t∑
j=1
(1− xj)
ζa,d − ψa,c
 t∑
j=1
xj
ζa,c
 (6)
Attributes for Encryption Technologies We use a set of three attributes
that capture the aspects of the technologies that we wish to discuss. These
attributes are appropriate to demonstrate the model with the examples we use;
other technologies and applications of the model might use different attributes.
First, monetary cost: this is different from the notion of profitability in the
basic model, as this (profitability) acts as an aggregate term which includes all of
the other attributes; here, we just want to consider how expensive a technology
is. Second, usability: there has been a lot of research into the usability of various
encryption technologies and how the ease of their use has a large role in deter-
mining whether or not people choose to use them. Finally, functionality: this
expresses the range of functions that a technology or product covers that benefit
the user, not just in terms of encryption. For example, consider two competing
products: one has a great number of features that are useful to the user, but
offers no encryption, and one that has encryption, but lacks some of the other
features. The latter product, although it has increased functionality by offering
encryption, may have a lower total functionality.
3 Three Examples
In this section, we briefly introduce three examples of encryption technologies
that we use to demonstrate different aspects of the model. Here, we only look at
static situations; in Section 4, next, we explore the dynamics of these examples.
Models are implemented in the julia language [12].
The models depend critically on choices of values for a number of parameters.
Where possible, our choices have been informed by available data; where not, we
have estimated sensible values based on our modelling experience and knowledge
of the situations. Clearly, further systematic exploration of the parameter spaces
and their sensitivity would be valuable.
In each of the examples, a new technology is compared to a default, incum-
bent technology. The attribute values for the default technology are all 1. The
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Figure 1. Adoption: all three examples.
ρ Cost Usability Funct.
Default tech – 1.0 1.0 1.0
GPG/PGP 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.1
WhatsApp 1.0 1.05 1.0 1.1
SED 0.1 0.85 0.9 1.1
Table 1. Model parameters
values for each example are shown in Table 1. Values above 1 are better than
the incumbent technology; values below are worse. We use a value of β = 3.4 in
all examples.
The first two examples look at email encryption, comparing standard email
to email encrypted with PGP/GPG [8], and messaging apps, comparing normal
SMS messaging to the WhatsApp messenger. Both of these examples have a high
social component, ρ: the utility of the technology increases as more people use
it, and suffers when there are few other users. This is contrasted with the third
example, which compares standard hard drives to self-encrypting drives. Here,
ρ is low, as whether or not others are using the technology does not have a large
influence on its utility.
Now looking at costs, encryption software is available for free, so we give
it the same value as normal email. WhatsApp is potentially less costly than
traditional SMS messaging, which can charge for every message sent, well above
the equivalent cost of the data [9], and self-encrypting drives are more expensive
than normal drives.
Usability for encrypted email is much lower than standard email. As studies
have shown [14], it can be quite difficult for people to correctly encrypt their mes-
sages; more recently, Edward Snowden described GPG as ‘damn near unusable’
[11]. We assume that usability for WhatsApp is similar to regular messaging,
and that self-encrypting drives, with the overhead of key management, are less
usable than standard drives.
Finally, the functionality of all of the new technologies is greater than the
incumbents. Encrypted email is encrypted, as are self-encrypting drives, and
WhatsApp has additional features such as sending pictures and video messages.
Each of these examples have different equilibria, based on Equation 5, which
are shown in Figure 1. For email (1), there is only one equilibrium point, where
the share of encrypted email is close to zero. For WhatsApp (2), there are three
equilibria: two stable equilibria, one high and one low, and a third, unstable
equilibrium at x ≈ 0.3.
If WhatsApp starts from a small market share, it will grow until it reaches
the lower adoption share stable equilibrium. If there is some change or shock—a
sudden increase in profitability or usage, for example—that increases its market
share beyond the unstable equilibrium point, then its share will continue to grow
until it reaches the higher point and will dominate the market. This is not the
case for encrypted email where the low usability means that, although its value
increases with the number of people using it, without some ‘external impulse’
that changes the utility, the level of adoption will always return to the single,
low equilibrium point.
Finally, Figure 1 (3) shows the equilibrium of the self-encrypting drive ex-
ample. There is only one equilibrium (at x ≈ 0.35) and, because of the low ρ,
the value of the technology does not change a great amount based on the level
of adoption, which is mainly driven by the characteristics of the technology.
4 Dynamics of the Model and Discussion
So far, the models have been deployed to display the equilibria which can be used
for the comparative statics of technology adoption. We proceed by extending
the email encryption example to study the evolution of technology adoption
over time, in the presence of both exogenous policy influences and endogenous
technology changes.
The policy influences take the form of functions that influence the behaviour
of agents by changing the value of the utility of the different technologies.
Technology changes are modelled within the existing model structure as ei-
ther changes in the returns on investment over time, or instantaneous shocks
to utility-attribute parameters.
We analyse two dynamic aspects of the email encryption example. First, the
effect of events such as the Snowden revelations on its use, and, second, how
increases in the usability of the encryption software can increase its adoption.
On 5 June 2013, the first of the newspaper articles containing information
disclosed by Edward Snowden was published. The documents he released shed
light on the expansive electronic surveillance programs being run by the Amer-
ican and British governments. These revelations led to an increased desire to
protect the privacy of electronic communications. This can be seen directly in
Figure 2, which shows the total number of PGP/GPG keys registered on public
keyservers daily over several years [10]. The vertical line indicates the date of
the first Snowden article, immediately after which the rate at which keys were
added markedly increased.
While this doesn’t determine the exact number of people using encrypted
email—people can have multiple keys, some keys may be abandoned, etc.—it
clearly demonstrates that the revelations had an impact. We can model this
as a revelation of government policy: it adds additional costs to using regu-
lar email. We can implement this as a function for the functionality attribute
τfunctionality(x) = −0.2, which returns a constant value, rather than being de-
pendent on the share of adoption: insecure email is less useful, no matter how
many people are using it.
Figure 3 shows the effects of the policy compared to the previous case without
such policy (essentially, τfunctionality(x) = 0). There are now two stable equilib-
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Figure 3. Email adoption (1) with and (2)
without government surveillance policy.
ria, instead of just one. Unlike before, if, somehow, there was now a sudden large
increase in encrypted email use—to over 62 percent adoption, the location of the
unstable equilibrium—the system would change to the higher stable equilibrium
and encrypted email use would be dominant. However, a sudden increase of such
size is not likely, and the probable result is that the system stays at the lower
equilibrium, which has shifted slightly higher (from x ≈ 0.013 to x ≈ 0.028),
showing a small increase in the adoption of encrypted email.
These developments are assuming that there is no innovation around en-
crypted email and the technology and user experience stay constant. In reality,
the usability of encryption software is being improved. For example, Google and
Yahoo are working on a web browser plugin that provides end-to-end encryption
for their respective webmail services [4,13]. This plugin also manages key distri-
bution, aiming to make things easier for users than PGP/GPG’s Web of Trust
model. Other services, such as Keybase [7], which uses social network identities
as a means of verifying the identity of a key’s owner, are also attempting to
improve key distribution. How much efforts such as these will increase the use
of email encryption largely depends on how much they improve usability.
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Figure 4. Email adoption over time
We can use the technological progress model to look at how investment in
improving usability will affect adoption. Figure 4 shows the adoption over time
for four different scenarios. The first two have a low rate of return for invest-
ment in usability, one with the government policy and one without (ψusability,c =
0.05, ζusability,c = 0.1). The second two have a very high rate of return on invest-
ment, again with and without policy (ψusability,c = 0.2, ζusability,c = 0.3). In all
cases, the values for non-encryption are the same: ψusability,d = 0.01, ζusability,d =
0.01. We use α = 0.99 for the switching rate.
In the high-return cases, the investment causes the system to switch to an
equilibrium with high adoption of email encryption. The transition happens
much sooner with the government policy than without. In both of the low-return
cases, encryption never gets a large market share.
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